Photo Credit: Dr. Kiran Raman, There’s a new updated COVID-19 vaccine just in time for the respiratory virus season, Arizona Department of Health Services, October 11, 2023, https://directorsblog.health.azdhs.gov/theres-a-new-updated-covid-19-vaccine-just-in-time-for-the-respiratory-virus-season/.
Authored by Bethany M. Logan
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits workplace discrimination based on religion. Title VII requires employers to reasonably accommodate employee’s religious practices unless doing so results in undue hardship. In recent years, the COVID-19 pandemic sparked a wave of lawsuits involving religious objections to vaccination mandates. But how does the law distinguish between sincerely held religious beliefs and personal preferences masked as faith?
Title VII was amended in 1972 to clarify the definition of religious discrimination under the statute by stating that “[t]he term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”[1] Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an individual in hiring, firing, compensation, or any aspect of employment based on religion, race, color, sex, or national origin.[2] An employee must first demonstrate that they hold a genuine and sincerely held religious belief, which they have communicated to the employer, and that this belief conflicts with a job requirement.[3] The COVID-19 pandemic led to a surge of lawsuits, as employees who were required by their employers to get vaccinated sought religious exemptions.
As of March 1, 2022, EEOC guidance allows employers to request an explanation from employees who claim a religious objection to the COVID-19 vaccination requirement regarding how their religious beliefs, practices, or observances conflict with this mandate. [4] While religious beliefs are protected under the law, political beliefs are not, nor are general concerns about vaccine safety.[5] Employers are required to evaluate these objections on a case-by-case basis.[6] Additionally, religious accommodations may be revoked if an employee’s beliefs change or if granting such exemptions imposes an undue burden on the employer.[7] The Supreme Court has defined “undue hardship” as the employer bearing “more than a de minimis cost” or as infringing upon the rights of other employees.[8]
The Supreme Court laid out the test for whether a belief is religious in a case interpreting a conscientious objector statute.[9] The relevant objective test examined whether “the claimed belief occup[ies] the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption.”[10] The Court distinguished between individuals whose beliefs were genuinely religious and those whose views were “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical or a merely personal moral code.”[11] While the court should not inquire into the credibility of the beliefs, the court should “decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious.”[12] A belief in god is unnecessary; however, beliefs must “certainly occupy in the life of that individual ‘a place parallel to that filled by * * * God’ in traditionally religious persons.”[13]
The plaintiffs in Ringhofer sought religious accommodations for the mandatory vaccination policy instated by the employer, Mayo.[14] Plaintiffs alleged that the vaccination mandate conflicted with their Christian beliefs since “(1) according to Scripture, their body is a temple they must respect and protect, and (2) their anti-abortion beliefs, rooted in religion, prevent using a product produced with or tested with fetal cell lines.”[15] The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the employees’ claims and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, affirming the necessity of accommodating religious beliefs under Title VII.[16] The case has yet to be heard on remand.
In 2017, the Third Circuit focused on defining what constitutes a “sincerely held” religious belief.[17] Fallon’s employer began requiring employees to obtain a flu vaccine or submit an exemption form for a medical or religious exemption.[18] Importantly, Fallon did not claim to belong to any religious organization, but instead, he held a strong personal belief against flu vaccinations.[19] He was consequently suspended and ultimately terminated.[20] The court considered whether Fallon’s beliefs “address[ ] fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters, are comprehensive in nature, and are accompanied by certain formal and external signs.”[21] Fallon’s specific belief against the vaccine mandate was that it would “violate his conscience as to what is right and what is wrong.”[22] The court found that Fallon was concerned about the health effects of the flu vaccine, due to his disbelief of widely accepted science.[23] Therefore, the court concluded that Fallon’s beliefs were not similar to a more traditional faith and not religious for the purposes of Title VII.[24]
Following the decision in Fallon,the Third Circuit has continued to take that same stance. In Brown, the plaintiff complied with the company mandate to receive the flu vaccine; however, after five years she “could no longer go against [her] beliefs.”[25] Her evidence did not include a pastor to validate such beliefs, but instead an “advance vaccine directive” prepared by National Solutions Foundation which registered her opposition to vaccines.[26] Subsequently, Brown was fired for failure to comply with the flu vaccine mandate.[27] The court predominantly followed the Fallon analysis.[28] Despite the plaintiff’s argument that the “vaccine was unnecessary for her because she scrupulously washed her hands” the court found that her concerns about the vaccine were a medical belief, not a religious one.[29]
Earlier this year, the Seventh Circuit chimed in on the issue concerning the COVID-19 vaccine. In Passarella, the plaintiff worked at a hospital in Wisconsin that mandated a COVID-19 vaccination for all employees.[30] Passarella justified her Christian belief that her body “is [the Lord’s] dwelling place” and that “[a]fter prayerful consideration, I don’t feel at peace about receiving the COVID vaccine” and instead “must trust God with my body (His temple) and that he will provide for me and protect me as he has already proven time and time again during my life.”[31] The plaintiff also believed that the vaccine would cause blood clots or heart inflammation.[32] She also took the angle of the vaccine being inconsistent with her broader life pattern of eating organic foods and exercising.[33] The court agreed with Passarella since “[a]n employee may object to an employer’s vaccine mandate on both religious and non-religious grounds.”[34] Her Christian beliefs regarding the sanctity of the human body were sufficient for protection under Title VII.[35] The court also stated in dicta that there are limits to this analysis in which “[r]eligious accommodation requests rooting themselves entirely in safety considerations with no plain and express connection to religion will fall outside of the statute even at the pleading stage.”[36]
In conclusion, there is a strong circuit split on the interpretation of a “sincerely held” religious belief under Title VII. The Third Circuit has consistently ruled that personal or medical objections do not qualify as religious beliefs. In contrast, the Eighth Circuit has been more accommodating, affirming that religious objections tied to personal health practices can be protected. The Seventh Circuit strikes a balance, recognizing claims that combine religious and non-religious elements but limiting those based purely on safety concerns. Until the Supreme Court addresses this split, the question remains: How far should the law go to protect personal convictions in the guise of religion?
[1]42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
[2]42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
[3]See Fallon v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr. of Se. Pennsylvania, 877 F.3d 487, 490 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Under Title VII, in order to establish religious discrimination, the employee must have shown that (1) he held a sincere religious belief that conflicted with a job requirement, (2) he informed his employer of the conflict, and (3) he was disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting requirement.”); Dockery v. Maryville Acad., 379 F. Supp. 3d 704, 718 n.18 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (“[W]hile the validity of a religious belief cannot be questioned, the threshold question of sincerity . . . must be resolved in every case.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[4]§ 5:146 EEOC guidance on COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and other EEO laws, 1 Employee Medical Leave, Benefits and Disabilities Laws § 5:146.
[5]Id.
[6]Id.
[7]Id.
[8]Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977); see US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 394 (2002)(“As we interpret the statute, to show that a requested accommodation conflicts with the rules of a seniority system is ordinarily to show that the accommodation is not reasonable.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[9]United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965).
[10]Id.
[11]Id. at 165.
[12]Id. at 185.
[13]Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970) (“If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time, those beliefs” are sufficiently religious); see also Afr. v. Com. of Pa., 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981)(“First, a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters. Second, a religion is comprehensive in nature; it consists of a belief-system as opposed to an isolated teaching. Third, a religion often can be recognized by the presence of certain formal and external signs.”).
[14]Ringhofer v. Mayo Clinic, Ambulance, 102 F.4th 894, 898 (8th Cir. 2024).
[15]Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
[16]Id. at 903.
[17]Fallon, 877 F.3d at 488.
[18]Id. at 489.
[19]Id.
[20]Id.
[21]Id. at 491 (quoting Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[22]Id. at 492.
[23]Id.
[24]Id. (“[H]is concern that the flu vaccine may do more harm than good—is a medical belief, not a religious one.”).
[25]Brown v. Children’s Hosp. of Philadelphia, 794 F. App’x 226, 226 (3d Cir. 2020).
[26]Id.
[27]Id. at 227.
[28]Id.
[29]Id.
[30]Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc., 108 F.4th 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 2024).
[31]Id.
[32]Id.
[33]Id.at 1007-08(“I am asserting my rights as a Christian to be exempt from taking this vaccine. I feel it was developed in a rush. I don’t trust the information and long-term effects. Therefore I believe this is not right for me to put this vaccine into my body. I also feel that it’s my body and no one has the right to tell me what to do with my personal being. I have prayed about this and have asked GOD for guidance, and believe that HE is with me on this decision.”).
[34]Id. at 1009 (“[F]or example, on the view that receiving the vaccine would violate a religious belief and implicate health and safety concerns. Congress permitted this, as we see no other way to give effect to the breadth of its definition of ‘religion’—as covering ‘all aspects’ of an employee’s religious observance, practice, and belief.”).
[35]Id. at 1010-11 (“Perhaps above all else, then, one guidepost is clear: [c]ourts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs … because [they] are not articulated with the clarity and precision that a more sophisticated person might employ.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[36]Id. at 1011.
American Journal of Trial Advocacy 