Photo Credit: Mario Conti, The consumer experience, Mario Conti (Mar. 17, 2017), http://www.marioconti.com/the-consumer-experience/.
Authored by: Carrye Ann Rainer
On March 21, 2025, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in one of the term’s two pivotal white-collar cases, Thompson v. United States.[1] In a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court clarified that a federal statute criminalizing the knowing issuance of false statements to influence certain regulators and entities, including lenders and financial institutions, applies solely to statements that are factually false.[2] It does not extend to statements that, while literally true, may nonetheless be misleading.[3] This ruling reversed the Seventh Circuit’s decision convicting Patrick Thompson under 18 U.S.C. § 1014.[4]
Between 2011 and 2014 Thompson secured three loans from a bank, amounting to $219,000.[5] Following the bank’s failure in 2017, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) assumed responsibility for collecting the outstanding loans.[6] Thompson contested the balance of $269,120.58 on his invoice, asserting that he had only borrowed $110,000.[7] He reiterated this claim in multiple communications with FDIC contractors.[8] He subsequently settled his debt with the FDIC for $219,000, an amount that, notably, matched the precise principal sum of the loans he had obtained but purportedly failed to remember.[9] However, any elation he may have derived from his thousands in interest savings was likely cut short, as he was indicted on two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1014.[10] The statute at hand prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false statement or report . . . for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of . . . the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation . . . upon any . . . loan.”[11]
A jury subsequently convicted Thompson, and he sought acquittal, contending that his statements were not false, as he had indeed borrowed $110,000 initially, despite the larger amount he later owed.[12] Although Thompson acknowledged that his statements may have been misleading, he argued that he could not be convicted of making statements because his misrepresentations to the FDIC were “literally true.”[13] The lower courts rejected Thompson’s motion, concluding that the Seventh Circuit does not mandate literal falsity to establish a violation of § 1014, and the misleading statements alone are sufficient to support a conviction.[14]
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that § 1014 criminalizes only false statements, not statements that are misleading but literally true.[15] The key issue of this case ultimately turned on whether the ordinary meaning of “false” encompasses statements that are factually true yet misleading.[16] Justice Roberts, in illustrating how even technically accurate statements can be deceptive, referenced a particularly colorful hypothetical, which the government conceded at oral argument. In this example a doctor assures a patient, “I’ve done a hundred of these surgeries,” without disclosing that ninety-nine of those patients had died. While the statement is factually true, it is nonetheless misleading, as it could lead the listener to infer a record of success rather than failure. [17] With that recognition in mind, Roberts quickly dismissed the government’s argument, which he characterized as relying on a “dictionary in [one] hand” and a “thesaurus in the other.”[18]
The government had contended that “false” could simply mean “deceitful” and that “false” and “misleading” have historically been treated as synonymous.[19] The Court, however, was unpersuaded, noting that the government’s reasoning did little more than highlight the considerable overlap between the two terms, rather than demonstrating that they are legally interchangeable.[20] The Court reasoned that the government’s arguments simply bring light to the “substantial overlap” between the terms at issue. However, the overlap between the terms is irrelevant, and erroneously interpreting the word “false” to be synonymous with “misleading” would thus make the inclusion of “misleading” in the statutes in question superfluous.[21]
Justice Alito and Justice Jackson each authored separate concurring opinions, offering distinct perspectives on the Court’s reasoning. Justice Alito underscored the significance of context in determining whether a misleading statement rises to the level of a falsehood under the law.[22] Justice Jackson, meanwhile, wrote separately to highlight that the jury instructions in Thompson had been properly framed, as they referred exclusively to false statements without conflating them with misleading ones.[23] In her view, this left the Seventh Circuit with little to address on remand beyond affirming the District Court’s judgment upholding the jury’s guilty verdict.[24]
The Supreme Court’s decision in Thompson is poised to prompt increased resistance to broad prosecutorial interpretations of federal criminal statutes, particularly in cases involving false statement charges. This ruling is likely to embolden defendants to challenge expansive readings of fraud statutes, advocating for a more restrictive definition of what constitutes a false statement. Additionally, its implications may extend beyond the criminal context, as defendants seek to apply a narrower interpretation to regulatory civil enforcement actions by federal agencies.
The decision in Thompson follows a series of recent Supreme Court rulings that have limited the scope of federal fraud and corruption laws. Notably, in Ciminelli v. United States, the Court unanimously rejected the “right to control” theory as a valid basis for liability under the federal wire fraud statute.[25] Similarly, in Percoco v. United States, the Court struck down as unconstitutionally vague the “dominion and control” and “special relationship” test used to impose liability on private individuals allegedly influencing government affairs.[26] Additionally, in Kelly v. United States, the Court held that to sustain a conviction under federal fraud statutes, the government must demonstrate that the defendant engaged in deception for the purpose of obtaining property.[27] Together, these decisions reflect the Court’s ongoing trend of restricting overly expansive applications of federal fraud and corruption statutes, signaling heightened scrutiny of prosecutorial discretion in white-collar criminal cases.Thompson v. United States marks a significant development in the interpretation of false statement charges, particularly under § 1014.
By reinforcing the requirement that prosecutors prove actual falsity rather than relying on ambiguous or misleading statements, the Supreme Court has set a precedent that could impact a wide range of white-collar cases. This decision serves as a reminder of the importance of precise legal standards in financial fraud prosecutions and may lead to increased scrutiny of government charging decisions. Moving forward, defense teams will likely leverage Thompson to challenge allegations that lack clear evidence of falsity, potentially reshaping how these cases are litigated. As courts and prosecutors adjust to this ruling, its broader implications on financial fraud enforcement remain to be seen.
[1] 145 S. Ct. 821 (2025).
[2] Id. at 828-29.
[3] Id.
[4] Id. at 824.
[5] United States v. Thompson, No. 21-cr-00279-1 2022, WL 1908896, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2022).
[6] Thompson, 145 S. Ct. at 824.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id. at 824-25.
[10] Id. at 825.
[11] 18 U.S.C. § 1014.
[12] United States v. Thompson, 89 F.4th 1010, 1015 (7th Cir. 2024).
[13] Id.
[14] United States v. Thompson, No. 21-cr-00279-1 2022, WL 1908896, at *13 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2022).
[15] Thompson, 145 S. Ct. at 828-29.
[16] Id. at 826.
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] Id.
[20] Id. at 827.
[21] Thompson, 145 S. Ct. at 827 (citing Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995) (“[T]he Court will avoid a reading which renders some words altogether redundant.”)).
[22] Thompson, 145 S. Ct. at 829-30 (Alito, J., concurring).
[23] Id. at 830 (Jackson, J., concurring).
[24] Id. at 831.
[25] 598 U.S. 306, 317 (2023).
[26] 598 U.S. 319, 333 (2023).
[27] 590 U.S. 391, 404 (2020).
American Journal of Trial Advocacy 