Photo Credit: First Amendment Center, Mahmoud v. Taylor, in First Amendment Center, Middle Tennessee State University, https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/mahmoud-v-taylor/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2025).
Authored by: Justin P. Martin
The Classroom as a Test of Parental Rights
On June 27, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court delivered a 6–3 ruling in Mahmoud v. Taylor, holding that parents have a constitutional right under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause to opt their children out of school lessons that conflict with their religious beliefs, specifically instruction using LGBTQ+ themed storybooks.[1] This decision unmistakably reaffirmed principles articulated in Wisconsin v. Yoder, in which the Court held that Amish parents could withdraw their children from school after eighth grade, overriding Wisconsin’s compulsory attendance law because it burdened their religious practices.[2]
The facts of Yoder highlight why the case has become so influential. The Amish community believed that high school education beyond eighth grade conflicted with their religious way of life and threatened the cohesion of their community.[3] Wisconsin law required students to attend school until age 16, but the Amish parents argued that sending their children to public high school would expose them to values and experiences contrary to their faith.[4] The Supreme Court sided with the Amish parents, holding that the Free Exercise Clause protected their right to withdraw their children from school after eighth grade.[5] The Court reasoned that the state’s interest in universal education, while important, was not compelling enough to override the parents’ deeply held religious convictions, and that forcing Amish children to remain in school past eighth grade would substantially burden the practice of their religion.[6]
Why Mahmoud Is Not Just About New Facts
In Mahmoud, Justice Alito’s majority opinion explicitly embraced Yoder as a foundational precedent, rejecting claims that Yoder was unique and reinforcing that its broad principle remains intact.[7] The Court emphasized that when a policy imposes a burden similar to the facts in Yoder, strict scrutiny applies even if the law appears neutral or generally applicable.[8] The ruling highlights that Mahmoud is not simply a case about a single school district or a particular curriculum, but about the enduring principle that the state cannot compel children to participate in educational content that conflicts with sincerely held religious beliefs.[9] By framing the issue as one of fundamental parental authority, the Court extended the logic of Yoder to modern educational contexts, signaling that the balance between religious freedom and state interests must be carefully calibrated whenever schooling intersects with deeply held religious beliefs.
The Lineage: Other Landmark Cases Between Yoder and Mahmoud
Several pivotal Supreme Court decisions serve as stepping stones in this doctrinal arc. Long before Yoder, the Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters recognized that parents, not the State, hold the primary authority to direct their children’s education.[10] The decision famously declared that “the child is not the mere creature of the state.”[11] In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court protected students and families from compulsory patriotic rituals, affirming that public schools cannot force students to affirm beliefs contrary to their consciences.[12]
Mahmoud v. Taylor: The 2025 Ruling
In Mahmoud, a group of parents in Montgomery County, Maryland, challenged their school district’s cancellation of opt-out permissions for LGBTQ themed storybook lessons.[13] They argued that forced participation undermined their ability to guide their children’s religious upbringing, a core parental liberty established in Yoder.[14] The lower courts, both the district court and the Fourth Circuit, declined to intervene, deeming exposure to differing viewpoints insufficient to constitute a religious burden.[15] But the Supreme Court reversed, ruling that without notice or opt-out provisions, the policy placed an impermissible burden on religious exercise and therefore violated Yoder’s standard.[16]
Justice Alito underscored that the burden was not merely incidental, but posed a very real threat of undermining the parents’ religious values, mirroring the language used in Yoder.[17] The Court’s ruling indicates that public schools must notify parents and allow opt-outs when instructional materials conflict with sincerely held religious beliefs.[18]
Dissenting Voices and Broader Debate
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, warned in dissent that such notice obligations and opt-outs could saddle schools with untenable administrative demands and undercut the inclusive mission of public education.[19] The dissent further argues that by allowing parents to veto LGBTQ inclusion in classrooms, Mahmoud effectively mandates that schools preemptively remove queer content to avoid compliance burdens.[20]
Conclusion: A Continuum of Parental Rights
From Pierce’s declaration that children are not the State’s property, through Barnette’s safeguard against forced ideological instruction, to Yoder’s recognition of religiously rooted parental autonomy, culminating with Mahmoud, the Supreme Court has long recognized that parents retain fundamental constitutional authority over their children’s moral and spiritual development even within public schools. The Mahmoud decision does more than affirm Yoder. It revives a deeply rooted tradition of parental rights under the Free Exercise Clause, reinforcing that religious liberty does not vanish at the schoolhouse gate.
[1] See generally Mahmoud v. Taylor, 145 S. Ct. (2025).
[2] Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219 (1972).
[3] Id.
[4] Id. at 218.
[5] Id. at 219.
[6] Id. at 235.
[7] Mahmoud, 145 S. Ct. at 2357 (“[T]here is no reason to conclude that the [Yoder] decision is ‘sui generis’ or ‘tailored to [its] specific evidence[.]’”).
[8] Id. (“[W]e need not ask whether the law at issue is neutral or generally applicable before proceeding to strict scrutiny”).
[9] Id.
[10] Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
[11] Id.
[12] W. Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
[13] Mahmoud, 145 S. Ct. at 2363.
[14] Id. at 2358.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] Id. at 2357 (“We have at times relied on [Yoder] as a statement of general principles.”).
[18] Id. at 2364 (“[T]he Board should be ordered to notify them in advance whenever one of the books in question or any other similar book is to be used in any way and to allow them to have their children excused from that instruction.”).
[19] Mahmoud, 145 S. Ct. at 2381 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
[20] Id. at 2382 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
American Journal of Trial Advocacy 