Photo Credit: Building a Workers’ Comp Policy for GA Staffing Agencies, Work Comp Options Program (Aug. 5, 2025), https://workcompoptions.com/building-a-workers-comp-policy-for-ga-staffing-agencies/.
Authored by: Brady W. Heard
Background of Alabama’s Workers’ Compensation Act
Since the adoption of Alabama’s first Workers’ Compensation Act in 1919, the Alabama legislature has provided a statutory remedy for individuals sustaining injuries while in the line and scope of their employment.[1] The codification of a statutory compensation scheme serves as a means to ensure that workers receive adequate monetary relief, in lieu of potentially receiving inconsistent or inadequate remedies through the common law system.[2] Prior to codifying Alabama’s Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Act”), employers were capable of asserting several “common-law defenses,” ultimately preventing employees from recovering monetary relief for their on-the-job injuries.[3] Before the codification of Alabama’s Workers’ Compensation Act, employers and co-employees could assert the common-law defenses of “contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and [the] fellow servant doctrine” to limit recovery for workplace injuries.[4]
Two key features of the Act—which have recently become a point of contention—are the exclusivity provision[5] and the non-severability clause.[6] The exclusivity provision ultimately bars a litigant from initiating a negligence action against their employer to recover damages for injuries or death resulting from a workplace accident.[7] In other words, the exclusivity provision provides a blanket of substantive immunity for employers receiving coverage under the Act, shielding the employer from the exorbitant costs of litigation, unpredictable pay-outs due to the growing trend of nuclear verdicts, and detrimental impacts to commercial productivity that constantly having to litigate workplace injuries would incur.[8] At the same time, the provision ultimately preserves the efficacy of the State’s judicial system, by ensuring the courts are not bogged down by excessive cases. The tradeoff is that employees may receive less than desirable monetary relief afforded by the Act; however, where an employee would be without due compensation until the entering of a final judgment under the common-law system, the Act guarantees that an employee will receive weekly compensation until the conclusion of their workers’ compensation case.[9]
The art of encouraging legislative reform has oft been left to lobbyists and the judiciary.[10] Remaining mindful of the centuries-old doctrine of stare decisis, the latter has been successful in orchestrating reform through masterfully crafted opinions, nudging legislatures to enact change, all the while showing deference to constitutionally vested powers of the coequal branches of government.
However, as of late, a concerted effort has commenced across the state of Alabama to abrogate its Workers’ Compensation Act. Through creative and carefully crafted arguments, challenges have been launched questioning the constitutional standing of the Act.[11] Below is a detailed analysis of the most recent case the Alabama Supreme Court has reviewed regarding the constitutionality of Alabama’s Workers’ Compensation Act.
Crenshaw v. Sonic Drive in of Greenville, Inc.
In Crenshaw v. Sonic Drive in of Greenville, Inc., the Alabama Supreme Court was tasked with determining the constitutionality of Alabama’s Workers Compensation Act.[12] Crenshaw involved a minor’s parent bringing a negligence action against Sonic, due to injuries the minor sustained from an accident “‘arising out and in the course of [the minor’s] employment’ with [the restaurant].”[13] Although the events giving rise to the plaintiff’s cause of action occurred while in the line and scope of their employment, the plaintiff’s complaint was devoid of any request for relief via workers’ compensation benefits.[14] Subsequently, Sonic filed a dispositive motion contending that the plaintiff, by asserting a cause of action under the common law theory of negligence, failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because the plaintiff’s negligence claim is “barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Act.”[15]
Crenshaw contends that the Act specifically violates Article I, § 13, of the Alabama Constitution of 2022,[16] because the Act does not contain a mutually elective feature allowing an employee to voluntarily “opt out of [workers’ compensation] coverage.”[17] Crenshaw supports his position by focusing on two decisions from 1978, namely, Grantham v. Denke[18]and Pipkin v. Southern Electrical & Pipefitting Co.[19] The court in Crenshaw acknowledged that the Grantham and Pipkin courts ultimately determined that the Act violated Article I, § 13 of Alabama’s Constitution[20]; however, the Crenshaw court notes Crenshaw is mistaken in the controlling law, because the “seminal decision regarding challenges to the Act made under § 13”[21] is Reed v. Brunson.[22]
In Reed, the court recognized that Grantham and Pipkin used the “‘common-law-rights approach’ in evaluating whether [the Act] . . . violated § 13.”[23] However, the Reed court explains that in similar challenges to the constitutionality of statutory provisions, the Alabama Supreme Court subjects constitutional challenges, particularly proclaiming violations the “open courts doctrine,” to the “vested rights approach.”[24] Thus, the Crenshaw court elected that the constitutional challenge to the Act should be subjected to scrutiny under the “common-law-rights approach” and the “vested rights approach.”[25]
Under the common law rights approach, legislation will ultimately survive scrutiny and be deemed constitutional if it satisfies one of the two following conditions: “(1) [t]he right is voluntarily relinquished by its possessor in exchange for equivalent benefits or protection, or (2) [t]he legislation eradicates or ameliorates a perceived social evil and is thus a valid exercise of the police power.”[26]
Previously, the court applied the “vested rights approach,” which allows for the Act to “pass[] constitutional muster with respect to Article I, § 13” if “[the plaintiff’s] injuries occurred after the Act became law . . . .”[27] The Crenshaw court ultimately subjected the plaintiff’s constitutional challenge to both the common-law-rights and vested-rights approaches to determine the constitutionality of the Act.[28] The court determined that the Act survives constitutional scrutiny under the vested rights approach, because “[the employee’s] workplace injury occurred after the Act became law. Thus, [the plaintiff] did not have a vested right in a cause of action when the Act was enacted.”[29]
When evaluating the case under the common-law-rights approach, the court determined it was unnecessary to consider the first prong of the two-part test, because the Act only needs to pass one part of the disjunctive test.[30] The court reasons that since the Act satisfies the “the police-power condition” a discussion of the first condition is pretermitted.[31] In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the legislative intent of the act[32] and a treatise on Alabama’s Workers’ Compensation.[33] Ultimately, the court determined that the exclusivity provision of the Act, was a valid exercise of the legislature’s police power, because the provisions guarantees that an injured employee will receive compensation without the need for incurring extensive legal expenses or having to face the high probability of a disfavorable outcome under the common law system.[34]
Conclusion
The Alabama Supreme Court’s decision in Crenshaw v. Sonic Drive in of Greenville, Inc., underscores the necessity of preserving the statutory compensation scheme, guaranteeing employees adequate monetary relief for workplace injuries, while at the same time illustrating the court’s deference to legislative policy choices in the field of workers’ compensation. By reaffirming that the Act withstands constitutional scrutiny under both the vested-rights and common-law-rights approaches, the court not only preserved the quid pro quo structure of workers’ compensation, but also reinforced the principle that balancing employee remedies with employer liability rests primarily with the legislature.
[1] 1 Michael Roberts, Alabama Tort Law § 13.01 (7th 2022).
[2] See Steven W. Ford & James A. Abernathy, II, Historical Development of Alabama’s Workers’ Compensation Law: Remedies Existing Prior to Workers’ Compensation Legislation, 61 Ala. Law. 48, 50 (“The beneficent purposes of the Alabama Act are: to provide certain relief to workers . . . avoid delay of relief associated with taking a tort claim to trial . . . [and] shift[ing] the burden of industrial injuries on the industry that caused the injury.”).
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Ala. Code § 25-5-52.
[6] Ala. Code § 25-5-17 (“The provisions of this act are expressly declared not to be severable. If any provision of this act shall be adjudged to be invalid by any court of competent jurisdiction, then this entire act shall be invalid and held for naught.”); see also Lawrence T. King, A Tort Defense in Crisis? The Defense That is the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act, 81 Ala. Law. 136, 137 (quoting Clower v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 2013-904687 (Jefferson CO. Cir. Ct., Order of May 8, 2017) (Judge Ballard) (“Because the Court finds those statutes to be unconstitutional, the entire Workers’ Compensation Act is declared unconstitutional because of the non-severability statute . . . .”)). Judge Ballard’s ruling was ultimately abandoned due to the parties executing a settlement of all claims prior to the implementation of the ruling or before initiating an appeal of the underlying case. See King, supra.
[7] Ala. Code § 25-5-52 (“[N]o employee of any employer subject to this chapter, nor the personal representative, surviving spouse, or next of kin of the employee shall have a right to any other method, form, or amount of compensation or damages for an injury or death occasioned by an accident or occupation disease . . . resulting from and while engaged in the actual performance of his or her employment . . . .”).
[8] See Chapman v. Railway F. Co., 101 So. 879, 881 (Ala. 1924) (quoting Jensen v. Southern Pacific Co., 109 N.E. 600, 602 (N.Y. 1915) (“It protects both employer and employee, the former from wasteful suits and extravagant verdicts, the latter from the expense, uncertainties, and delays of litigation in all cases, and from the certainty of defeat if unable to establish a case of actionable negligence.”)).
[9] Id. at §§ 25-5-57(a)(1)-(2); see also 1 Temple Trueblood, Alabama Employment Law § 11.02(2)(b) (Mathew Bender) (“[W]age loss benefits are only received following a three-day waiting period.”).
[10] Thomas W. Merrill, Symposium: Justice Stevens and the Chevron Puzzle, 106 Nw. U.L. Rev. 551, 563 (2012).
[11] See e.g., Clower v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 2013-904687 (Jefferson Co. Cir. Ct., Order of May 8, 2017) (challenging the constitutionality of the $220 per week cap on benefits for permanent partial disability and the Act’s statutory cap on attorney’s fees); Taylor v. Cloud Enterprises Corp., Inc., No. 2023-902537 (Jefferson Co. Cir. Ct., dismissed Mar. 6, 2024) (challenging the constitutionality of the Act because of the $220 per week cap for permanent partial disability benefits, the inability for employees to opt out of coverage, and the Act is “so eroded that it no longer affords an adequate quid pro quo”); Larry Huey v. Stryker Trailers, LLC., No. 2023-900328 (Calhoun Co. Cir. Ct., dismissed Dec. 4, 2023), appeal docketed, No. 2024-0083 (Ala. Feb. 13, 2024), No. 2024-0083 (Ala. dismissed May 28, 2024) (challenging the constitutionality of the Act because of the $220 per week cap for permanent partial disability benefits, the inability for employees to opt out of coverage, and the Act is “so eroded that it no longer affords an adequate quid pro quo”); Weaver v. Frank Norton, LLC, No. 2024-901440 (Jefferson Co. Cir. Ct., dismissed Aug. 5, 2024); Carter-Shepherd v. Royal Furniture Co., No. 2022-900008 (Jefferson Co. Cir. Ct., Order Mar. 21, 2025), appeal docketed, (Ala. Civ. App., Apr. 14, 2025) (challenging the constitutionality of Ala. Code § 25-5-90(a), the attorney fee cap);
[12] No. SC-2024-0081, 2024 Ala. LEXIS 197, at *1 (Dec. 6, 2024).
[13] Crenshaw, 2024 Ala. LEXIS 197, at *1.
[14] Id.
[15] Id. at *1-2 (citing Ala Code §§ 25-5-52 to -53).
[16] Ala. Const. art. I, § 13 (“That all courts shall be open; and that every person, for any injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have a remedy by due process of law; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay.”).
[17] Crenshaw, 2024 Ala. LEXIS 197, at *4 (“[O]nly an employer, not an employee, may choose to completely opt out of coverage under the Act.”).
[18] 359 So. 2d 785 (Ala. 1978).
[19] 358 So. 2d 1015 (Ala. 1978).
[20] Crenshaw, 2024 Ala. LEXIS 197, at *4-8.
[21] Id. at *8-9.
[22] 527 So. 2d 102 (Ala. 1988).
[23] Crenshaw, 2024 Ala. LEXIS 197, at *8-9.
[24] Id. (discussing how the court in Reed applied both the “common-law-rights approach” and the “vested rights approach”).
[25] Id. at *21.
[26] Id. at *14 (quoting Reed, 527 So. 2d at 352).
[27] Id. at *13-4 (“When a duty has been breached producing a legal claim for damages, such claimant cannot be denied the benefit of his claim for the absence of a remedy. But this provision does not undertake to preserve existing duties against legislative change made before the breach occurs. There can be no claim for damages to the person or property of anyone except as it follows the breach of a legal duty.”).
[28] Id. at *21-3.
[29] Id. at *22.
[30] Id. at *26.
[31] Id.
[32] Id. at *29 (“The intent of the Alabama Legislature in adopting the exclusivity provisions of the Act was to provide complete immunity to employers and limited immunity to officers, directors, agents, servants or employees of the same employer . . . for all causes of action except those based on willful conduct.”).
[33] Id. at *35 (quoting 1 Terry A. Moore, Alabama Workers’ Compensation §§ 1:4 and 1:5 (2d ed. 2013)) (“By adhering to the concept of fault, Alabama courts assured that most workers who were injured on the job would not receive financial relief from employers. In most cases, employment-related injuries did not arise out of the employer’s negligence. By relying on the concept of negligence . . . the Alabama courts practically foreclosed employees from meaningful redress for the injuries they suffered due to their employment.”).
[34] Id. at *34-7.
American Journal of Trial Advocacy 