Photo Credit: Photograph of Hermes Birkins, in Everything You Need to Know About the Hermes Birkin, Sotheby’s (Feb. 21, 2024), https://www.sothebys.com/en/articles/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-hermes-birkin.
Authored by: Abigail C. Frazier
In Cavalleri v. Hermes International, luxury shoppers brought a class action challenging the sales practices of Hermes International and Hermes of Paris (collectively, “Hermes”).[1] In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that Hermes requires customers to purchase other Hermes products to qualify for a famed Birkin bag, which plaintiffs argue constitutes an unlawful tying arrangement under the Sherman Act Sections 1 and 2,[2] as well as several California consumer-protection statutes.[3]
Hermes, founded by harness-maker Thierry Hermes in 1837,[4] has evolved into a global luxury brand, famous for its high-end goods, including leather bags, silk scarves, and shoes, to name a few.[5] The Birkin bag, at the center of this case, is famously expensive, notoriously difficult to purchase, and widely viewed as a “symbol of ultimate luxury.”[6] Plaintiffs Tina Cavalleri and others claimed that Hermes conditioned access to a Birkin on a customer’s willingness to purchase other Hermes products first, a practice they characterized as coercive and anticompetitive.[7] The lawsuit, filed in March of 2024 in the Northern District of California, sought class action status and attempted to frame Hermes’ sales strategy as an antitrust violation.[8]
The court previously dismissed the plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint with leave to amend, finding the allegations insufficient on several core antitrust elements such as relevant product markets, market power, and antitrust injury.[9] As the court explained, the First Amended Complaint “did not plausibly allege relevant product markets, defendant’s market power within those markets, or an injury that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.”[10]
Before the court in this instance was the plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint.[11] Plaintiffs alleged that Hermes “won’t sell them a famed Birkin bag unless they are ‘deemed worthy’ by buying other Hermes products.”[12] Plaintiffs argued that this conduct constitutes an “unlawful tying arrangement in violation of Sherman Act Section 1 and 2” as well as multiple California laws that the court ultimately declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over.[13] Hermes moved to dismiss the case pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and Rule 12(b)(6). Ultimately, Judge James Donato dismissed the case with prejudice on September 17, 2025, finding the plaintiffs still failed to “plausibly allege[] that Hermes engaged in anticompetitive conduct with respect to the Birkin bag.”[14] According to the court, the plaintiffs’ second attempt “did not provide any new facts that might have filled in the gaps in the prior complaint and raised plaintiffs’ antitrust theories above a purely speculative level.”[15] In other words, the plaintiffs repeated the same conclusions without supplying the factual basis antitrust pleading standards require.[16]
The court’s analysis focused heavily on tying arrangements.[17] Under antitrust law, a tying arrangement occurs when a seller conditions the sale of one product (the tying product) on the purchase of another distinct product (the tied product).[18] More specifically, a tying arrangement requires proof that: (1) two distinct products are tied, (2) the seller has market power in the tying market, and (3) the arrangement affects a significant volume of commerce in the tied product market.[19] Notably, tying practices are not per se illegal; rather, they require a demonstration of market power and harm to competition.[20] Like the First Amended Complaint, the Second Amended Complaint did not adequately define the relevant market for the Birkin bag nor did it establish Hermes’ market power within that market, relying instead on outdated academic sources and conclusory statements.[21]
While Plaintiffs alleged Hermes conditioned Birkin sales on other purchases, the court emphasized that these claims did not rise “above a purely speculative level.”[22] First, the plaintiffs’ market definition, “elitist luxury handbags in the United States,”[23] was conclusory and unsupported. As the court put it, the plaintiffs complaint “simply described consumer perceptions about product quality and exclusivity from more than a decade ago” which under antitrust law is “a far cry from properly defining a relevant market.”[24] Lastly, the Second Amended Complaint failed to allege competitive harm, which is “another essential element of a tying claim.”[25] The court highlights that plaintiffs attempt to allege that a “kaleidoscope of products” are a part of the tied market, practically everything from clothing and accessories to home décor, but also notes that “[t]he [Second Amended Complaint] is bereft of any facts that might support lumping such a hugely diverse array of non-substitutable products into a single market.”[26] Moreover, the Complaint lacks facts that Hermes illegally restrained the competition for the aforementioned goods.[27] The court concedes that Hermes may be reserving Birkins for their biggest spenders, but it emphasizes that this business practice is not illegal under antitrust law.[28]
The dismissal of this case reinforces a longstanding principle pertaining to pleading: courts require factual, rather than conclusory, allegations.[29] Less than a month after the court dismissed the case, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal, and the case is now before the Ninth Circuit.[30] This appeal gives the plaintiffs another opportunity to test whether luxury-goods distribution practices like Hermes’s can fit within modern tying doctrine, though the Northern District of California’s reasoning suggests the plaintiffs will face the same challenges on review. In its dismissal, the court made a point to acknowledge the fact that this was the plaintiffs’ “third opportunity to state a plausible Sherman Act claim.”[31] The court went as far as saying plaintiffs had ample notice, yet they still failed to cure the deficiencies within their federal claims.[32] The decision in Cavalleri reinforces that luxury brands may remain somewhat exclusive without automatically triggering antitrust scrutiny, so long as they do not wield market power in a way that harms competition.
[1] Cavalleri v. Hermes Int’l, No. 24-cv-01707-JD, 2025 WL 2662897, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2025).
[2] Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2.
[3] Id. (“[T]his amounts to an unlawful tying arrangement in violation of. . . the California Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16720 et seq., the California Unfair Competition Law, Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq., the California False Advertising Law, Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq., and California common law.”).
[4] Hermes, https://www.hermes.com (last visited Jan. 13, 2026).
[5] See id.
[6] David Kully & Jennifer Lada, Hermes Bags Antitrust Win That Clarifies Luxury Tying Claims, Holland & Knight (Jan. 12, 2026), https://www.hklaw.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2025/10/law360_hermesbagsantitrustwinthatclarifiesluxurytyingclaims.pdf?rev=0bccd15b8d0f4849a409e639a82e51af&hash=F8937FAA2481B6C1367A6982F7BDF4E4
[7] First Amended Class Action Complaint at 8, 11, No. 3:24-cv-01707-JD (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2024).
[8] See id.
[9] Cavalleri, 2025 WL 2662897, at *1.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Id. at*1, 3.
[14] Id. at *3.
[15] Cavalleri, 2025 WL 2662897, at *1.
[16] See generally Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 352 U.S. 980 (1957); Int’l Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
[17] Cavalleri, 2025 WL 2662897, at *1-2.
[18] Id. at *2; see also Rick-Mik Enters., Inc. v. Equilon Enters., Inc., 532 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 2008).
[19] Cavalleri, 2025 WL 2662897, at *1, 2.
[20]Id. at *1.
[21] Id.
[22] Id.
[23] Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 6, No. 3:24-cv-01707-JD (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2024).
[24] Cavalleri, 2025 WL 2662897, at *2.
[25] Id. at *3.
[26] Id.
[27] Id.
[28] Id.
[29] See generally Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. 2; N. Pac. Ry. Co., 352 U.S. 980; Int’l Salt Co., Inc., 332 U.S. 392; Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 547 U.S. 28.
[30] See Notice of Appeal, No. 3:24-cv-01707 (Oct. 7, 2025).
[31] Cavalleri, 2025 WL 2662897, at *3.
[32] Id.
American Journal of Trial Advocacy 