Photo Credit: Amy Howe, Justices Appear Wary of Striking Down Domestic-Violence Gun Restriction,SCOTUSblog, (Nov. 7, 2023), https://www.scotusblog.com/2023/11/justices-appear-wary-of-striking-down-domestic-violence-gun-restriction/.
Authored by: Aubry Hunt
In 2008, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess firearms for lawful purposes such as self-defense.[1] At the same time, the Court made clear that this right is “not unlimited.”[2] More recently, in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, the Court reshaped Second Amendment analysis by rejecting traditional interest-balancing approaches and directing courts to evaluate firearm regulations based on whether they are consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.[3]
That shift created immediate uncertainty. Lower courts struggled to determine how closely modern firearm laws must resemble historical regulations, and some courts required nearly identical historical counterparts.[4] The Supreme Court addressed that confusion in United States v. Rahimi, refining how courts should apply the historical framework and confirming that individuals who pose a credible threat to others may be disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.[5]
In Rahimi, Zackey Rahimi was subject to a domestic violence restraining order issued after a hearing in which a court found that he posed a credible threat to the physical safety of another person.[6]Despite that order, Rahimi possessed firearms and was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibits firearm possession by individuals subject to certain domestic violence restraining orders.[7]Rahimi challenged the statute, arguing that it violated the Second Amendment.
After Bruen, the Fifth Circuit agreed, concluding that the Government failed to identify a sufficiently similar historical analogue to justify the restriction.[8] The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether § 922(g)(8) could survive under the historical framework announced in Bruen.
Ultimately, the Court reversed. It was held that when an individual has been found by a court to pose a credible threat to the safety of another, that individual may be temporarily disarmed without violating the Second Amendment.[9] In doing so, the Court reaffirmed that firearm regulations need not precisely match founding-era laws, so long as they are consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition.[10]
The most significant aspect of Rahimi is its clarification of the Bruen test. Under Bruen, once the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the conduct at issue, the government must demonstrate that the challenged regulation aligns with historical tradition.[11] But Rahimi explains that this inquiry is not a search for a “historical twin.”[12] Instead, courts must determine whether modern laws are “relevantly similar” to historical regulations by examining both why the regulation exists and how it burdens the right to keep and bear arms.[13]
This clarification moves the analysis away from rigid historical matching and toward a more workable, principles-based approach. As recent scholarship has observed, Rahimi confirms that courts should focus on the underlying justifications and mechanisms of firearm regulations rather than demanding precise historical correspondence.[14] By emphasizing principles instead of exact matches, the Court restored flexibility to Second Amendment analysis while remaining anchored in history.
Applying that framework, the Court pointed to historical laws that restricted access to firearms for individuals who posed a danger to others. These included surety laws, which required individuals suspected of future violence to post a bond, and laws prohibiting the carrying of weapons in a manner that terrorized the public.[15] Although these laws did not perfectly resemble § 922(g)(8), they reflected a consistent principle: the government has long had the authority to prevent dangerous individuals from misusing firearms.[16]
At the same time, the Court imposed an important limitation. It rejected the idea that individuals may be disarmed based on generalized judgments about irresponsibility.[17] Instead, disarmament must be tied to a formal judicial finding that the individual poses a credible threat to the safety of others.[18]This requirement keeps Second Amendment restrictions grounded in objective legal standards rather than broad or subjective assessments.
The decision also reflects a broader principle withing criminal law. Courts often must account for competing liberty interests when individual rights intersect with the safety of others.[19] The right to possess a firearm is fundamental, but it may be limited when its exercise threatens the liberty and safety of another person. By upholding § 922(g)(8), the Court recognized that protecting potential victims can justify narrowly tailored restrictions on individuals who have been found to pose a real risk of harm.
Rahimi also provides needed guidance for lower courts. In the immediate aftermath of Bruen, some courts interpreted the historical tradition test narrowly, invalidated modern regulations that lacked close historical counterparts.[20] Rahimi rejects that approach and confirms that courts may rely on broader historical principles when evaluating contemporary firearm laws.
For practitioners, the key question after Rahimi is not whether these types of restrictions are permissible in the abstract, but whether the required judicial findings have been properly established in the individual case. Prosecutors can rely on Rahimi to defend statutes that target individuals who pose a demonstrable risk of harm, particularly where those restrictions are supported by clear findings.[21]Defense attorneys, in turn, should focus on whether those findings, including the existence of a credible threat, were adequately supported.[22] More broadly, litigators should be prepared to engage in historical analysis that emphasizes principles rather than exact historical matches.[23]
Ultimately, Rahimi reinforces that the Second Amendment, while fundamental, does not prevent the government from addressing modern threats through historically grounded regulations. By clarifying that courts should look for relevant analogues rather than identical historical laws–and by recognizing the need to balance individual rights with public safety–the Supreme Court has provided a more practical framework for evaluating firearm regulations going forward.
[1] District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).
[2] Id. at 626.
[3] New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 24 (2022).
[4] United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 739 (2024) (Barrett, J., concurring).
[5] United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 689-90 (2024).
[6] Id. at 685-86.
[7] 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).
[8] United States v. Rahimi, 61 F.4th 443, 460 (5th Cir. 2023).
[9] Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 689-90.
[10] Id. at 690.
[11] Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24.
[12] Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 690.
[13] Id. at 691-92.
[14] Constitutional Law – Second Amendment – En Banc Ninth Circuit Upholds Felon-in-Possession Ban Under Rahimi. – United States v. Duarte, 137 F.4th 743 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc), 139 Harv. L. Rev. 831, 836-37 (2026).
[15] Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692-96.
[16] Id. at 696.
[17] Id. at 701.
[18] Id.
[19] Sheldon A. Evans, A Liberty-Balancing Approach to Crime, 62 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 155, 156-57 (2025).
[20] Rahimi, 61 F.4th at 454-60.
[21] Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 689-90.
[22] 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).
[23] Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29-30.