Photo Credit: Caitlyn A. Kinard & Matthew Cavedon, Olivier v. City of Brandon Brief: Protecting the Right to Recover for Free Speech Violations, Cato Institute (August 29, 2025, 4:41 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/olivier-v-city-brandon-brief-protecting-right-recover-free-speech-violations
Authored by: Chandni Patel
Since its enactment in 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has provided an avenue for individuals whose Constitutional rights have been deprived to sue state or local authorities.[1] A § 1983 action allows individuals to pursue a wide range of remedies including monetary damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.[2] Over the years, the Supreme Court has defined the purview of the statute, declaring when an individual is or is not barred from bringing an § 1983 action. In certain cases, this determination is based in part on what relief the individual chooses to seek.[3] In Olivier v. City of Brandon, Mississippi, the Court once again addressed this issue, providing much needed clarification on their prior ruling in Heck v. Humphrey and preventing the circuit split from expanding in the lower courts.[4]
The petitioner, Olivier Gabriel, is a Christian preacher from Mississippi who often walked the streets in the City of Brandon, hoping to share his religious views with others.[5] In 2019, the City of Brandon enacted an ordinance requiring all protestors or demonstrators to remain with a designated area during scheduled events.[6] In 2021, after protesting on the sidewalk in front of an amphitheater with signs and a speaker instead of in the designated protest area, Olivier was convicted of violating the ordinance.[7] After pleading no contest in municipal court, Olivier paid a $304 fine and received one year of probation.[8] However, if Olivier violated the ordinance again during probation, he would serve ten days in prison.[9]
Seeking to preach outside the amphitheater without fear of violating the ordinance, Olivier filed suit under § 1983 against the City and its police chief, alleging that the City of Brandon’s ordinance violated his First Amendment right to free speech.[10] Consequently, Olivier sought both declaratory and injunctive relief, asking the court to declare the ordinance unconstitutional and to impose an injunction preventing the City from enforcing the ordinance.[11] Notably, Olivier did not seek any relief pertaining to his prior conviction for violating the ordinance such as reversal or compensation.[12] Instead, Olivier sought only prospective relief.[13] That is, he sought relief that concerned the future, not the past.
In the lower courts, the City of Brandon and Olivier disputed whether the Supreme Court’s ruling in Heck v. Humphrey prevented Olivier’s suit.[14] In Heck, the petitioner brought a § 1983 action against county prosecutors after being convicted for voluntary manslaughter, arguing that they had destroyed exculpatory evidence which would have demonstrated his innocence at trial.[15] Heck sought monetary damages, but did not seek any further relief.[16] However, the Seventh Circuit noted that if Heck succeeded in his claim, the state would be forced to release him from custody, regardless of whether he sought that specific relief in his suit.[17] The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had no cognizable claim under § 1983 and was therefore barred from recovering damages because a judgment is his favor would render his conviction invalid.[18]
With this holding in mind, the City of Brandon argued that Heck barred Olivier’s lawsuit, claiming that because Olivier was previously convicted for violating the ordinance he could not subsequently challenge the ordinance as being unconstitutional.[19] In contention, Olivier argued that the Heck bar was limited in two ways, that Heck (1) did not bar suits involving only prospective relief, and (2) did not apply where the individual was never imprisoned for the conviction.[20] The lower courts found the City’s interpretation to be more accurate, with the District Court finding that Olivier’s suit would “undermine his [m]unicipal [c]ourt conviction,”[21] and the Fifth Circuit noting it would “necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s criminal conviction.”[22]
After the Fifth Circuit denied rehearing, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Heck bar applied to Olivier’s § 1983 suit.[23] In a unanimous decision, the Court concluded that Heck did not apply because this suit “merely attempts to prevent a future prosecution.” [24] The Court further noted that because Olivier is seeking only prospective relief, unlike in Heck, there is no fear of parallel litigation or collateral attack on an old conviction.[25] With Heck no longer applying, the Court turned to their decision in Wooley v. Maynard. [26] In Wooley, the Court held that Maynard was not barred from bringing a § 1983 action where the suit was not intended to undermine the validity of the state trial.[27]
Accordingly, the Court held that Olivier could bring a § 1983 suit to prevent future enforcement of the City’s ordinance.[28] Where the § 1983 action does not question or undermine the validity of a prior conviction, the Heck bar does not apply. The Court emphasized that to hold otherwise would place Olivier in the difficult position of choosing between “flout[ing] the law and risk[ing] another prosecution” and “forgo[ing] speech he believes is constitutionally protected.”[29] Ultimately, the Court’s decision in Olivier places an important restriction on the Heck bar and effectively dissolves the newly formed circuit split.
[1] 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
[2] Id.
[3] See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (“Thus, when a state prison seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”)
[4] 607 U.S. 552, 556 (2026); Id.
[5] Olivier, 607 U.S. at 556.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id. at 557.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Id. (“And Olivier has since made clear that he has no interest in using a favorable judgment in this suit to later get his record expunged or avoid his conviction’s collateral effects.”)
[14] Id. at 557-58.
[15] Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 478-79 (1994).
[16] 512 U.S. at 479.
[17] Id. at 480.
[18] Id. at 486-87.
[19] Olivier v. City of Brandon, Mississippi, 607 U.S. 552, 557 (2026).
[20] Olivier, 607 U.S. at 557-58.
[21] Id.at 558 (quoting Olivier v. City of Brandon, Mississippi, No. 3:21-CV-00636-HTW-LGI, 2022 WL 15047414, at *11 (S.D. Miss., Sept. 23, 2022)).
[22] Id. (quoting Olivier v. City of Brandon, Mississippi, No. 22-60566, 2023 WL 5500223, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 25, 2023)).
[23] Id. at 559.
[24] Id. at 564.
[25] Id.
[26] Id. at 556-67.
[27] Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 711 (1977).
[28] Olivier, 607 U.S. at 567.
[29] Id. (“We declined to put Maynard to that choice, and we will not put Olivier to it either.”).