Photo Credit: Robert Maslonka, Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment: When the Music Stops, Who Pays?, Lewis Brisbois (Nov. 25, 2025), https://lewisbrisbois.com/insights/blogs/cox-communications-inc-v-sony-music-entertainment-when-the-music-stops-who-pays.
Authored by: Catherine E. Haggerty
With the use of the internet, individuals are able to access a variety of works that have been subject to copyright.[1] Given these circumstances, the Supreme Court has recognized theories of “secondary copyright liability.”[2] For example, in Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment, the Court evaluates whether Cox Communications, Inc. (“Cox”) was liable for the copyright infringement of its users for the secondary liability theory of contributory liability.[3]
- Underlying Facts
Cox is a large internet provider and serves roughly 6 million total subscribers, who each possess a unique IP address for their usage.[4] Although Cox can connect subscribers and IP addresses to one another, they cannot specifically “control how their internet services are used.”[5] On the other hand, Sony Music Entertainment (“Sony”) owns copyrighted music, and Sony has encountered a variety of difficulties in protecting their copyrighted works.[6] Thus, Sony sought the help of internet providers, like Cox, to protect their copyrighted works.[7] In this working relationship, Cox would receive notifications from MarkMonitor, a company whose software “detects apparently infringing activity.”[8] Cox stated that they had a system in place to limit the infringing activity once notified.[9] After two notices of infringing activity, Cox would send a notice to the subscriber associated with the IP address.[10] If Cox received further notices, it would suspend the IP address for the infringing subscriber until it received a response from the subscriber regarding the notices.[11] Furthermore, if the notices from MarkMonitor continued, Cox would call the subscriber and provide a “warning over the phone.”[12] However, it was not until Cox received 13 notices of infringing activity that Cox would terminate the subscriber’s use of “all Internet service.”[13]
Despite Cox’s system to catch infringing activity, Sony claimed that Cox did not take adequate action to terminate the subscribers that were clearly using internet services for infringement.[14] Cox did not terminate subscribers’ use, even after receiving 163,148 notices of infringing activity.[15] Therefore, Sony claimed copyright liability against Cox under the theories of vicarious liability and contributory liability.[16] The district court held that Cox was both contributorily liable and vicariously liable for copyright infringement of Sony’s works.[17] The Fourth Circuit held that Cox was contributorily liable because they “continued to provide Internet service to known infringers,” relying on precedent that if the provider merely knows that their services are used for infringing activity, they are liable.[18] The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s holding of Cox’s vicarious liability as they received no financial gain for the copyright infringement.[19]
- Supreme Court’s Analysis
Despite issues of both contributory and vicarious liability, the Supreme Court only reviewed the Fourth Circuit’s holding that Cox was contributorily liable for copyright infringement.[20] Under the theory of contributory liability, the provider must have “intended that the provided service be used for infringement.”[21] Thus, intent is proven by showing that the party “induced the infringement.”[22] Secondly, intent can be shown through proving that a provider’s specific “service is tailored to that infringement.”[23] Previously, the Court held companies liable whose “‘principal object’ of their business model” was to allow for the download of works that were copyrighted.[24] However, if the service could provide “‘substantial noninfringing uses’” than there is no liability for the provider.[25] Furthermore, “mere knowledge that a service will be used to infringe” does not meet the threshold of the intent required to prove that a provider is contributorily liable for infringement.[26]
Therefore, the Court held that Cox was not liable for copyright infringement under the theory of contributory liability.[27] They neither intended for their services to be used for infringement nor induced infringement or tailored their services towards infringement.[28] This decision conflicted with the lower court’s decision that Cox was contributorily liable for copyright infringement because Cox knew that a recipient of their product would use their product for copyright infringement.[29] The Supreme Court found the lower court’s holding not only erroneous, but in direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s precedent. [30]
- Impact since the Supreme Court’s Decision
It is no doubt that the Cox Communications holding limits copyright liability under secondary theories of liability. Since the Court’s holding in Cox Communications, there have been efforts to distinguish cases from the limited scope presented in Cox Communications. For example, in Stuart Force v. The Palestinian Authority & The Palestine Liberation Organization, plaintiffs alleged that defendants created a program that planned to “pay Palestinians who carry out attacks against nationals in Israel.”[31] The court distinguished Stuart from Cox Communications, because the plaintiffs in Stuartalleged that the defendants promised a benefit or gain to individuals who committed a terrorist attack.[32] Such an affirmative encouragement was far beyond the actions of Cox of continually providing internet access despite notice of infringing activity.[33] The actions in Stuart were explicit, not passive, therefore, the defendant’s motion to dismiss was denied because there were enough inferences that the defendant “knowingly and substantially assisted” in the attacks at issue.[34]
Cox Communications further narrowed secondary liability in copyright infringement under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Cox Communications, joined by Justice Jackson, stated that the decision essentially “dismantles” aspects of the DMCA.[35] Under the DMCA, Congress provided that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) should implement safeguards against copyright infringement activities, but they also relieved ISPs from liability in every situation of infringement.[36] The DMCA did so by providing a “safe harbor” from secondary copyright liability when a service provider implements a policy that terminates user access when “subscribers . . . repeatedly infringe copyrights using the ISP’s network.”[37] According to Sotomayor, the majority opinion of Cox Communications provides ISPs with a freedom that allows them to give internet service “to every single infringer who wants one without fear of liability and without lifting a finger to prevent infringement,” without any reference to the safe harbor provided by the DMCA.[38] Still, the majority held that in their allegations, “Sony overreads the DMCA,” and that the safe harbors provided by the Act only expand possible defenses to copyright infringement, rather than impose liability.[39]
As a result of Cox Communications, sources have encouraged the decision’s upholding of First Amendment rights, and its effect on allowing individuals to maintain their internet access.[40] Such sources criticized Sony’s allegations as an “attempt to reach into deep pockets at the expense of personal liberty.”[41] However, as technology advances, only time will tell how or if user access will be affected by the liability of internet providers for copyright infringement.
[1] Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment, 146 S. Ct. 959, 964 (2026).
[2] Id.
[3] Id. at 967.
[4] Id. at 965.
[5] Id. (“For instance, if an Internet service provider learns that someone illegally downloaded music from a coffee shop’s IP address, the Internet service provider cannot determine which individual at the coffee shop infringed the copyright.”).
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Cox Communications, 146 S. Ct. at 965.
[12] Id. at 965-66.
[13] Id. at 966.
[14] Id.
[15] Stuart Force v. The Palestinian Authority & The Palestine Liberation Organization, No. 25-cv-8582, 2026 WL 2295893, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2026) (citing Cox Communications, 146 S. Ct. at 965-66).
[16] Cox Communications, 146 S. Ct. at 966.
[17] Id.
[18] Id. (quoting Sony Music Entertainment v. Cox Communications, Inc., 93 F.4th 222, 236 (4th Cir. 2024)).
[19] Id. (quoting Sony, 93 F.4th at 233).
[20] Id. at 967.
[21] Id.
[22] Id.
[23] Id.
[24] Id. (quoting Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 926 (2005)).
[25] Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984)).
[26] Cox Communications, 146 S. Ct. at 968.
[27] Id.
[28] Id.
[29] Id.
[30] Id. at 969.
[31] 2026 WL 2295893, at *1.
[32] Id. at *14.
[33] Id.
[34] Id. at *17.
[35] Cox Communications, 146 S. Ct. at 971. (Sotomayor, J., Concurring).
[36] Id. at 972 (Sotomayor, J., Concurring).
[37] Id. at 972 (Sotomayor, J., Concurring).
[38] Id. at 972 (Sotomayor, J., Concurring).
[39] Id. at 969.
[40] Matthew A. Shatto, All Rights Reserved … for Disney: Corporate Mouse Traps, A Frozen Public Domain, and How A.I. May Usher in A Whole New World for Copyright, 77 Mercer L. Rev. 1775, 1791 n. 150 (2026) (“This case is a landmark decision protecting First Amendment rights, rejecting the invitation to revoke internet use based only on unilateral, unproved accusations that one has violated an already deeply flawed body of law, as levied by billion-dollar corporations against individuals.”).
[41] Id.