Photo Credit: Luke McCoy, Supreme Court Takes Up the Case That Could Strike Down Assault Weapon Bans Nationwide, USA Carry (July 1, 2026), https://www.usacarry.com/supreme-court-takes-up-the-case-that-could-strike-down-assault-weapon-bans-nationwide/.
Authored by: Lauren McCombs
Touch a hot stove, and you’ll get burned. For decades, the Supreme Court seemed to treat the Second Amendment the same way, approaching it a few times but ultimately keeping its distance. However, the Justices no longer seem worried about getting burned, as the Court has now agreed to decide one of the most contested questions about gun rights. On June 30, 2026, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Viramontes v. Cook County, consolidated with Grant v. Higgins, for one hour of oral argument during the October 2026 Term.1 The consolidated cases present a single question that has divided litigants and the lower courts since the Court reshaped Second Amendment doctrine over the past two decades: whether the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right to possess AR-15-platform and similar semiautomatic rifles that are in common civilian use.2 Viramontes arises from a Seventh Circuit challenge to Cook County, Illinois’s ban on “assault weapons,” while Grant arises from a Second Circuit challenge to Connecticut’s analogous ban.3 These are the first rifle-ban cases the Court has agreed to hear since it declined review in Snope v. Brown in 2025.4
The modern Second Amendment framework rests on only a handful of decisions. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court held that the Second Amendment secures an individual right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes such as self-defense, and struck down the District of Columbia’s handgun ban.5 Heller identified self-defense as the “central component” of the right,6 but it also recognized limits, stating the Amendment protects arms “in common use at the time,” a limitation the Court tied to “the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’”7 The Court further observed that “weapons that are most useful in military service, M-16 rifles and the like, may be banned.”8 Two years later, McDonald v. City of Chicago held that the right recognized in Heller also applies against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.9
In New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, the Court set out the framework that governs today. Bruen rejected the interest-balancing scrutiny that many lower courts had applied and instead adopted a text-and-history inquiry. A challenger must first show that the Amendment’s plain text covers the conduct at issue, after which the government must “justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”10 The Court also indicated that a weapon is presumptively protected if it is “in common use today for self-defense.”11 Two Terms later, United States v. Rahimi applied that framework to uphold a federal statute disarming persons subject to domestic violence restraining orders, cautioning that the historical inquiry requires a “relevantly similar” analogue rather than a “dead ringer.”12 Further, in Caetano v. Massachusetts, a per curiam decision, the Court reaffirmed that the Second Amendment reaches “bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.”13
Members of the Court had signaled that the AR-15 question was coming. Dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Snope, Justice Thomas argued the issue warranted review, and Justice Kavanaugh, in a statement respecting that denial, wrote that the Court “should and presumably will” address the AR-15 issue soon.14 Viramontes now places that question squarely before the Court.15 Cook County’s Blair Holt Assault Weapon Ban prohibits the manufacture, sale, transfer, and possession of enumerated “assault weapons” and large-capacity magazines. It defines an “assault weapon” as a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a detachable magazine and bearing one or more military-style features.16 The petitioners, individual gun owners together with the Firearms Policy Coalition and the Second Amendment Foundation, sued, contending that the ordinance violates the Second Amendment.17
The litigation unfolded against shifting circuit precedent. When the suit was filed, the Seventh Circuit’s decisions in Friedman v. City of Highland Park and Wilson v. Cook County foreclosed the challenge.18 After Bruen, and while cross-motions for summary judgment were pending, the Seventh Circuit decided Bevis v. City of Naperville, which upheld materially identical laws at the preliminary-injunction stage.19 Bevis reasoned that weapons “exclusively or predominantly useful in military service” fall outside the Amendment’s text, concluding that AR-15-style rifles are “much more like machine guns and military-grade weaponry” than guns ordinarily used for individual self-defense.20 The district court granted summary judgment for the County, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the challenge “falter[ed] for want of an adequate record” and that the petitioners had offered no compelling reason to revisit Bevis.21
The petitioners contend that the decision below conflicts with Heller and Bruen. They argue that the Amendment’s plain text extends to all “bearable arms,” so a ban on what they describe as the most popular rifle in the country necessarily implicates the Second Amendment and cannot be resolved at Bruen’s textual requirement.22 Relying on Heller’s statement that arms “in common use” are protected, they argue the AR-15 is in common use by any plausible measure, citing figures that more than twenty million of the banned rifles are in circulation.23 They further argue that the “common use” question belongs at Bruen’s second step, where the government bears the burden, so the County, not the petitioners, had to show that the banned arms are “highly unusual in society at large.”24 They add their evidence of common use consists of “legislative facts” exempt from the ordinary rules of evidence and thus properly considered even without formal discovery.25 Finally, they contend that the Seventh Circuit’s “military use” test lacks support in text, history, or precedent,26 and that the banned rifles are not “military-grade” because they fire only one round per trigger pull, unlike the fully automatic M-16.27 The petitioners also press for a uniform approach on how the Bruen framework applies to arms bans. For instance, whether the “text” step includes a threshold “arm-or-not” inquiry, whether “common use” is assessed at the text or the history stage, and what exactly the “common use” analysis requires.28
Cook County defends the judgment on both procedural and merits grounds. Procedurally, the county argues that this is a poor case in which to settle the question, because the petitioners gave up their constitutional arguments by refusing to take part in discovery and failing to build a proper evidentiary record. Instead, the County says petitioners leaned on materials that were untimely and amounted to inadmissible hearsay.29 Since Bruen was “based on the historical record compiled by the parties,” the County contends that the record deficiencies are dispositive regardless of which side bears the burden.30 On the merits, the County argues that the banned rifles are “dangerous and unusual” and therefore fall outside the Second Amendment’s protection.31 They present a factual record on the weapons’ lethality, including muzzle velocity, kinetic energy, effective range, and wounding capacity, alongside a historical record tracing the regulation of especially dangerous arms.32 The County also invokes a tradition of “moderate, proportionate self-defense,” relying on Blackstone and early American authority for the principle that using more force than a situation required could turn an otherwise-excusable killing into manslaughter. That tradition, the County argues, supports a line between military weapons and those meant for personal defense.33 Further, they emphasize that the record contains no instance of the banned rifles ever being used in lawful self-defense.34
The Court granted review on a single question: whether the Second Amendment protects AR-15-platform rifles in common use. Its decision stands to resolve much of what has splintered the lower courts. It could settle whether the common-use inquiry belongs at the text or the history stage of Bruen, and who bears the burden of establishing common use. It could also clarify whether common use turns on lawful possession or on actual defensive use, and whether the tradition of prohibiting dangerous and unusual weapons can sustain categorical bans on commonly owned semiautomatic rifles.35 With the case now consolidated alongside Grant, the ruling will reach bans framed by enumerated model and by feature set alike. That breadth carries consequences for every other State and locality that maintains a comparable law.36 Oral argument is expected during the October 2026 Term, with a decision likely by the end of the Term in June 2027.38 Whatever course the Justices take, Viramontes v. Cook County gives the Court its first occasion since Bruen to decide whether one of the nation’s most commonly owned rifles falls within the Second Amendment’s protection or beyond it.
1 The Court granted certiorari in Viramontes and consolidated it with Grant v. Higgins, No. 25-566, for one hour of oral argument on June 30, 2026. See Viramontes v. Cook County, Scotusblog, https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/viramontes-v-cook-county/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2026); see also Amy Howe, Court Grants Several New Cases, Including on Whether the Second Amendment Protects Possession of Semiautomatic Rifles, Scotusblog (June 30, 2026).
2 The question presented is whether the Second and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to possess AR-15-platform and similar semiautomatic rifles. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Viramontes v. Cook County, No. 25-238 (U.S. Aug. 27, 2025).
3 The grant in Grant v. Higgins was limited to the question presented in Viramontes. Grant arises from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and challenges Connecticut’s semiautomatic-rifle ban, while Viramontes arises from the Seventh Circuit and challenges Cook County’s ordinance. See supra note 1.
4 See Snope v. Brown, 145 S. Ct. 1534 (2025) (mem.).
5 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).
6 Id. at 599.
7 Id. at 627.
8 Id.
9 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).
10 N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17, 24 (2022).
11 Id. at 32.
12 United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 692 (2024).
13 Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 411, 411 (2016) (per curiam) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 582).
14 Snope, 145 S. Ct. at 1534-39 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
15 See supra note 1.
16 Blair Holt Assault Weapons Ban, Cook County, Ill., Code of Ordinances §§ 54-210 to -215; see Brief in Opposition at 11–12, Viramontes v. Cook County, No. 25-238 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2025).
17 Brief in Opposition, supra note 16, at 12.
18 Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015); Wilson v. Cook Cnty., 937 F.3d 1028 (7th Cir. 2019); see Brief in Opposition, supra note 16, at 12–13.
19 Bevis v. City of Naperville, 85 F.4th 1175 (7th Cir. 2023).
20 Id. at 1194–95.
21 Viramontes v. Cook Cnty., No. 24-1437, 2025 WL 1553896 (7th Cir. June 2, 2025); see Brief in Opposition, supra note 16, at 19.
22 Reply Brief for Petitioners at 3–4, Viramontes v. Cook Cnty., No. 25-238 (U.S. Nov. 12, 2025); see Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 605 U.S. 280, 297 (2025).
23 Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 22, at 4; see Smith & Wesson Brands, 605 U.S. at 297.
24 Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 22, at 5 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24, and Heller, 554 U.S. at 627).
25 See Fed. R. Evid. 201 advisory committee’s note; Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 22, at 5, 9–10.
26 Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 22, at 6–7.
27 Id. at 7–8; see Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 602 n.1, 612 (1994).
28 Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 22, at 1–3; see United States v. Bridges, 150 F.4th 517, 524, 528 (6th Cir. 2025); Nat’l Ass’n for Gun Rights v. Lamont, 153 F.4th 213, 233 (2d Cir. 2025); Duncan v. Bonta, 133 F.4th 852, 916 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (VanDyke, J., dissenting).
29 Brief in Opposition, supra note 16, at 24–26.
30 Id. at 26 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 25 n.6).
31 Id. at 30-31.
32 Id. at 5–9.
33 Id. at 32–33 (citing 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 182–83 (Oxford 2016); State v. Wells, 1 N.J.L. 486 (1790)).
34 Id. at 9.
35 See Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 22, at 1–3; Brief in Opposition, supra note 16, at 22–23.
36 See supra note 1.
37 Brief in Opposition, supra note 16, at 24–30.
38 The consolidated cases are expected to be argued during the October 2026 Term, with a decision anticipated by the end of the Term in June 2027. See supra note 1.