Photo Credit: Steve Knutson, grayscale photography of man sitting on chair (photograph 2018) https://unsplash.com/photos/grayscale-photography-of-man-sitting-on-chair-lQ2BzDNmnHE.
Authored by: Kate McCaw
“[H]omeless, please help.”[1]
Messages like this are easy to overlook, but in Taylor v. Singleton, they sit at the center of a broader inquiry into what constitutes free speech and whether the First Amendment protects the act of asking for help.
On March 2, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear Alabama’s appeal of an Eleventh Circuit decision prohibiting state law enforcement from arresting individuals experiencing homelessness, for panhandling.[2] By denying certiorari, the Court left intact a significant First Amendment principle: begging, or individual requests for charitable assistance, constitutes protected speech.[3] Although the Court declined review, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, and the arguments presented in opposition, underscore both the doctrinal stability of this rule and the limits of governmental authority to regulate public solicitation.[4]
I. Background
Taylor arose from a challenge to two Alabama statutes regulating public solicitation.[5] The first prohibits individuals from standing near roadways to solicit contributions from motorists.[6] The second criminalizes loitering in public places for the purpose of requesting money.[7] These provisions were enforced against individuals displaying signs such as “homeless please help.”[8]
Jonathan Singleton, a homeless resident of Montgomery affected by the statutes, brought a class action alleging that both statutes violated the First Amendment.[9] The district court granted summary judgment and permanent injunctive relief, concluding that the statutes impermissibly burdened protected speech.[10] The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, and the State petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court denied.[11]
II. The Eleventh Circuit’s Approach
The Eleventh Circuit approached the case by asking whether the challenged statutes regulated protected expressive activity.[12] The court concluded that they did.[13] Central to its analysis was the recognition that begging is properly understood as a request for charitable relief, which falls within established First Amendment doctrine protecting charitable solicitation.[14]
That conclusion follows directly from Supreme Court precedent. In Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, the Court explained that “charitable appeals for funds” are protected because they involve the communication of information, the dissemination of ideas, and advocacy of causes, which are all protected.[15] The Court reaffirmed this principle in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., emphasizing that speech does not lose protection simply because it involves a request for money.[16]
Relying on its prior decision in Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that begging constitutes protected speech.[17] Unlike the narrowly tailored ordinance upheld in Smith, however, Alabama’s statutes broadly restricted solicitation across public fora without preserving adequate alternative channels for communication.[18] Because the State declined to defend the statutes under any level of First Amendment scrutiny, the court concluded that no constitutionally permissible applications could sustain them.[19]
III. The State’s Theory and Its Limits
Rather than defend the statutes under traditional First Amendment frameworks, the State advanced a more sweeping claim that begging falls outside the First Amendment entirely.[20] Specifically, the petitioner urged the Court to recognize begging as a new category of unprotected speech, relying primarily on historical vagrancy laws.[21]
That position was reinforced by a coalition of nineteen states and the Territory of Guam, which filed an amicus brief emphasizing the importance of preserving state authority to regulate public solicitation in the interest of safety and public order.[22]
This approach is notable for what it omits. The State did not attempt to justify the statutes as reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions or argue that they were narrowly tailored to serve compelling governmental interests.[23] Instead, it sought to bypass First Amendment scrutiny altogether.[24] In doing so, the argument reflects broader federalism concerns, as states emphasized their interest in maintaining control over local safety and public order, even where such regulation intersects with constitutionally protected expression.
IV. Why the Argument Failed
The respondent’s brief in opposition and the lower courts’ decisions identify several reasons this argument fails.[25]
First, there is broad judicial consensus that begging constitutes protected speech, leaving no circuit split warranting Supreme Court review.[26]
Second, Supreme Court precedent firmly establishes that charitable solicitation is protected expressive activity.[27] In Schaumburg, the Court made clear that charitable appeals fall within the First Amendment’s core protections.[28] Subsequent decisions, including Riley, reaffirm that requests for financial support remain protected even when intertwined with economic motives.[29] The Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that begging falls within this doctrine reflects a straightforward application of these principles.[30]
Finally, the State’s attempt to create a new category of unprotected speech conflicts with modern First Amendment doctrine.[31] The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that new categorical exclusions are disfavored and must be grounded in a longstanding historical tradition.[32] The historical record cited by the petitioner fails to meet that standard.[33] As the brief in opposition explains, early vagrancy laws often regulated conduct rather than the communicative act of requesting assistance, and many such laws would be unconstitutional under contemporary doctrine.[34]
V. Implications
Taken together, these principles clarify the doctrinal baseline left intact by the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari. Government regulation of begging must satisfy First Amendment scrutiny.[35]
This has several practical implications. Laws targeting solicitation based on communicative content will likely trigger heightened scrutiny, particularly where they restrict speech in traditional public fora.[36] Broad prohibitions that eliminate meaningful opportunities for expression are especially vulnerable.[37]
At the same time, regulation remains permissible. States retain the ability to impose reasonable, narrowly tailored time, place, and manner restrictions designed to address legitimate concerns such as traffic safety and pedestrian access.[38]
VI. Conclusion
Taylor v. Singleton reinforces a foundational First Amendment principle: the Constitution protects not only formal advocacy but also requests for charitable assistance. By declining review, the Supreme Court allowed a strong consensus among lower courts to stand, recognizing begging as speech and requiring the government to justify any restriction.
This case also reflects an ongoing tension between constitutional protections and state regulatory authority, highlighting the role of federalism in shaping how courts balance expressive rights with local concerns for safety and public order. Going forward, courts will continue to play a central role in defining the limits of state authority to regulate public solicitation within the bounds of the First Amendment.
[1] Brief in Opposition at i, Taylor v. Singleton, No. 25-368 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2026).
[2] Taylor v. Singleton, No. 25-368, 2026 WL 568289, at *1 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2026).
[3] See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (holding that charitable solicitation is protected speech because it communicates ideas and advocacy); see also Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 789 (1988) (reaffirming that requests for financial support are protected expression); Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that begging constitutes protected speech).
[4] See Brief in Opposition at 8–10, Taylor v. Singleton, No. 25-368 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2026) (arguing that courts uniformly recognize begging as protected speech and no circuit split exists); see also Singleton v. City of Montgomery, No. 23-11163, slip op. at 13–14 (11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2025) (holding Alabama statutes unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
[5] Singleton v. City of Montgomery, No. 23-11163, slip op. at 3 (11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2025).
[6] Ala. Code § 32-5A-216(b).
[7] Ala. Code § 13A-11-9(a)(1).
[8] Brief in Opposition, supra note 1, at i.
[9] Singleton, slip op. at 4.
[10] Id. at 4–5.
[11] Singleton, slip op. at 14; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 27, Taylor v. Singleton, No. 25-368 (U.S. 2026); Taylor v. Singleton, No. 25-368, 2026 WL 568289, at *1 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2026).
[12] Singleton, slip op. at 6–7.
[13] Id. at 13.
[14] Id. at 7, 12.
[15] Vill. of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632.
[16] Riley, 487 U.S. at 788–89.
[17] Smith, 177 F.3d at 956.
[18] Singleton, slip op. at 13–14.
[19] Id. at 14.
[20] Brief in Opposition, supra note 1, at 1.
[21] Id. at 3.
[22] Brief of Amici Curiae States of South Carolina et al. in Support of Petitioner at 2–3, Taylor v. Singleton, No. 25-368 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2026).
[23] Id. at 8, 28.
[24] Id.
[25] Singleton, slip op. at 15; Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 22, at 8.
[26] See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 22, at 8–10 (“The First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all held that begging is protected speech under the First Amendment.”).
[27] Singleton, slip op. at 12; see Vill. of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632 (recognizing charitable solicitation as protected expressive activity).
[28] Vill. of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632.
[29] Riley, 487 U.S. at 789.
[30] Singleton, slip op. at 12–13.
[31] Brief in Opposition, supra note 1, at 16-18.
[32] See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-69 (2010) (explaining that new categories of unprotected speech must be grounded in historical tradition).
[33] Singleton, slip op. at 6.
[34] Brief in Opposition, supra note 1, at 22.
[35] See Vill. of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632 (holding that charitable solicitation is protected speech); see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (explaining that content-based laws regulating speech are subject to heightened scrutiny); see also Smith, 177 F.3d 954, 956 (holding that begging is protected speech).
[36] See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476 (2014) (“Traditional public fora,” which hold a special position in terms of First Amendment protection, are areas that have historically been open to the public for speech activities.”).
[37] Id. at 490.
[38] See Vill. of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632 (recognizing that solicitation may be regulated through appropriately tailored restrictions); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (holding that content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions are permissible if narrowly tailored and leave open alternative channels for communication).